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HINCKLEY v. GERMANIA FIRE INSURANCE CO.
The temporary illegal use, without a license, of property insured, if uncontem.
plated at the time of taking out the policy, would not of itself, and as a matter of
law, render the policy void during the whole of the rest of the time which it was to
run. It would simply vitiate the policy during the time of the illegal use, and when
such illegal use stopped, the policy would revive.
It is not the necessary meaning of the word "void," as used in policies of insurance, that it shall, under all circumstances, imply an absolute nd permanent avoidance of a policy which had once begun to run. The meaning of the word is
sufficiently satisfied by reading it as void or inoperative for the time being.
Where a license is granted to two persons under Pub. St. c. 102, s. 111, to keep
a billiard or pool table, or a bowling-alley, for hire, it is available to each of them.

Tins was an action of contract upon a policy of insurance against
fire upon a pool table and other saloon fixtures. At the trial in the
Superior Court a verdict was ordered for the defendant, and the case
reported for the consideration of the Supreme Court.
J. H. & T. C. Day, for plaintiff.
X. & C. A. Williams, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
0. ALLEN, J.-The report does not state the grounds upon which
the ruling rested, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
The defendants, in their brief, rely on various objections, which we
have considered.
In the first place, the defendants suggest that there is certainly
great doubt whether the license under which the plaintiff was doing
business on the day when the policy was dated and delivered was
of any validity, since this license ran to both brothers, Edwin and
Herbert, though Herbert had ceased to have any interest in the
place before the license was dated and issued. Io authority is cited
or reason assigned for so strict a construction, and we are of opinion that a license duly granted to two persons, under Public Statutes c. 102, s. 111, to keep a billiard or pool table, or a bowling
alley, for hire, is available to each of them. This is not like a case
where two persons seek to avail themselves of a license granted to
only one of tliem.
It is then urged that, after the license had expired, the plaintiff
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kept the insured property, in violation of law, from May 1st 1883,
till the last week in June 1883. The policy was dated March 15th
1888, and the license then existing, expired May 1st 1883. The
fire occurred on August 6th 1883, and it was conceded that there
was no illegal use of the property after the last week of the preceding June, at which time the plaintiff ascertained that his license
would not be renewed. The defendants rest their objection on two
grounds: First, that the illegality and criminality of the plaintiff's
act in respect to the injured property, vitiates the policy by operation of law, independently of any express provisions contained in
the policy; and, secondly, that under a provision of the policy the
right to recover was taken away. The authorities cited in support
of the first proposition do not support it. In Kelly v. Hfome ins.
Co., 97 Mass. 288, the policy was on intoxicating liquors, which at
the time of the insurance, and thereafter to the time of the loss,
were intended for sale in violation of law. The policy never attached. There was never a moment when the liquors were not
illegally kept, and all that the case decides is that goods so kept
at the time when the policy issued, or at the time of the loss, cannot be the subject of a valid insurance. In Johnson v. Union,Ins.
Co., 127 Mass. 555, the facts were pimilar. The policy was on
billiard table, balls, cues, &c., kept without a license at the time the
policy was issued, as well as at the time of the loss. The ground
of the decision in both of the above cases is stated to be "that the
object of the assured in obtaining the policy was to make their illegal business safe and profitable; and that the direct and immediate
purpose of the contract of insurance being to protect and encourage
an unlawful traffic, the contract was illegal and void, and the policy
never attached." The same facts existed in Lawrence v. National
Ins. Co., 127 Mass. 557. In Cunard v. Hyde,2 El. & El. 1, the
cargo which was the subject of insurance was partly loaded on deck
in violation of law, and while in that condition was totally lost.
In the present case, the plaintiff had a license at the time when
the policy issued, and the polfcy, therefore, was valid when obtained.
If it be assued without discussion that the policy would cease to
be operative during the time when the property was kept in use
without a license, the question remains whether such temporary
illegal use of the property has the effect to avoid the policy altogether
or merely to suspend it during the continuance of such illegal use.
There is nothing in the case to show that it was proved, as a mat-
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ter of fact, that the plaintiff at the time of taking out the policy,
intended to make it cover any illegal use of the property. He may
have expected -to get his license renewed; or, failing in that, he
may have intended to close the place where the property was used,
as, according to his own testimony, in point of fact he did. Under
this state of facts, we are of opinion that the temporary use of the
property without a license, if uncontemplated at the time of taking
out the policy, would not of itself, and as a matter of law, render
the policy void during the whole of the rest of the time which it
was to run. If there were any special or peculiar reasons why
such absolute invalidity should be declared, they should be made
to appear. In the absence of such reasons, such temporary and
uncontemplated illegal use of the property should not be visited
with so severe a penalty as the absolute avoidance of the policy.
It does not appear that the defendants were or would be in any way
injuriously affected thereby .after such illegal use had ceased. They
have the benefit of the temporary suspension of the risk, without
any rebate of the premium. There is no hardship to the defendants in requiring them to show an actual injury, or else to avail
themselves of the clause in the policy giving them a right to cancel
it upon notice, and a return of a ratable proportion of the premium.
There is no rule of law preventing the revival of a policy of insurance after a temporary suspension. "The doctrine that the risk
may be suspended, and again revive, without an express provision
for the purpose, seems to be within the strictest judicial principles :"
1 Phil. Ins. § 975. Accordingly, temporary unseaworthiness, if
the ship has become seaworthy again, will not defeat the policy: 1
Phil. Ins. § 730. So as to other stipulations; as, e. g., that of
neutral character and conduct: Id. § 975. And in Worthington v.
Bearse, 12 Allen 382, it was held, on great consideration by this
court, that if the assured in a marine policy temporarily parts with
his interest in the property insured, and afterwards buys it in again,
the policy will revive, if there are no express provisions making it
void, and there is no increase of risk. As between the insurer and
the assured, there is no reason why the former should be allowed
to avail himself of a temporary illegal use like that which existed
in the present case, unless it can also be shown that the subsequentrisk was thereby increased, or the position of the insurer otherwise
injuriously affected. And as a matter of general policy, it does not
seem reasonable to impose upon the assured so severe a consequence
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as the forfeiture of his policy, in addition to the penalty of $100,
which the legislature have considered adequate as the maximum
punishment for his offence against the public : Pub. Stat. c. 102,
s. 111.
It is further contended by the defendants that, however it might
be under the general rule of law, the policy contained a provision
making it void. In the standard form of policy established by the
legislature, which was used in the present case, the matters avoiding a policy are enumerated. Omitting matters not here material,
the provision is: "This policy shall be void * * * if the insured
shall make any attempt to defraud the company either before or
after the loss; or if gunpowder or other articles subject to legal
restrictions shall be kept in quantities or manner different from
those allowed or prescribed by law ; or if camphene, benzine, naphtha, or other chemical oil, or burning fluids shall be kept or used
by the insured on the premises insured, except that what is known
as refined petroleum, kerosene or coal oil may be used for lighting." In this Commonwealth, under the statutes for the regulation
of trade, and providing for licenses and municipal regulations of
police, there are a great many articles which, in a certain sense,
may be said to be "subject to legal restriction." Dogs, fish, nails,
commercial fertilizers, hacks and horses, in cities, may be referred
to as examples. It may well be questioned whether, under th6
maxim noscitur a soeiis, the clause in the policy above quoted ought
not to be limited in its application to other articles of a character
similar to gunpowder, the keeping of which may have a natural
tendency to increase the risk. It would be rather a strained construction of this clause to hold that a policy should be void because
an unlicensed dog was kept upon the premises; and yet such a dog,
being subject to legal restriction, would be kept in a manner different from that allowed by law. It would not be sensible to give
to these words the broadest construction of which they are susceptible.
But, irrespectively of this consideration, it is not the necessary
meaning of the word "void," as used in policies of insurance, that
it shall under all circumstances imply an absolute and permanent
avoidance of a policy which had once begun to run; but the meaning of the word is sufficiently satisfied by reading it as void or
inoperative for the time being. In Phil. Ins. § 975, it is said:
"After it (i. e., the policy) has begun, so that the premium is be.
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come due, it surely is but equitable that a temporary non-compliance should have effect only during its continuance. To carry it
further is to inflict a penalty on the assured, and decree a gratuity
to the insurer, who is thus permitted to retain the whole premium
when he has merited but part of it. A forfeiture certainly ought
not to be extended beyond the grounds on which it is incurred.
* * * And there does not appear to be any good reason why, in
the absence of all fraud and all prejudice to the underwriter, the
same doctrine should not be applicable to express conditions in the
nature of warranties or conditions, unless by the circumstances, or
the express provisions of the policy, such application is excluded."
In accordance with this doctrine, a provision in a policy that it
should be void, and be surrendered to the directors of the company
to be cancelled, in case of alienation of the property by sale or
otherwise, was held to be inoperative for the time being; and the
assured, upon acquiring title after a sale of the property by him,
was held entitled to recover: Lane v. Maine Ins. Co., 12 Me: 44.
So where a policy provided that "in case of any transfer or termination of the interest of the assured, either by sale or otherwise,
without such consent (i. e., of the company), this policy shall from
thenceforth be void and of no effect," it was held that after such
sale the policy revived upon the assured acquiring again the title,
and holding it at the time of the fire: Power v. Ocean Ins. Co.,
19 La, 28.
The same rule of construction has been applied to provisions
against other insurance: Obermeyer v.Globe Ins.Co., 43 Mo. 573;
New .Enqland Fire I Marine Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 38 Ill. 166;
Mitchell v. ]ycoming Ins. Co., 51 Penn. St. 402. The court in
Illinois has gone so far as to apply it also to a provision against an
increase of risk, which ceased before the loss: Schmidt v. Peoria
_Tns. Co., 41 Ill. 295; ITns. Co. of North America v. McDowell,
50 Id. 120, 129. Without at present going beyond what is called
for by the circumstances of the present case, we are of opinion that,
assuming the temporary use of the property insured, without a
license, to come within the prohibition of the policy in the clause
above quoted as to gunpowder or other articles subject to legal
restriction, yet that clause is not to receive such a construction
as to prevent the policy from reviving after such temporary use
has ceased.
The only remaining objection urged by the defendant is that the
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statements of loss rendered to them by the plaintiff were insufficient,
in failing to state that the plaintiff had no legal title to the injured
property, and that the Spurrs had an interest in it. But there is
no finding as a matter of fact that the plaintiff was not the owner
of the property, and upon the report of the case we cannot say,
as a matter of law, that it appears that he was not such owner :
Bailey v. lervey, 135 Mass. 172; XcCarty v. Henderson, 138
Id. 310. Moreover, no at tempt to defraud the defendants being
proved or charged, the provision of the policy that a statement
shall be rendered setting forth the interest of the insured therein
was sufficiently complied with. There was no provision calling for
an exact statement of his title or interest in detail, and a general
statement of ownership was sufficient: Powle v. Springfield Ins.
00., 122 Mass. 191.
New trial granted.
This case presents an interesting question: Will the illegal nic of property on
premises insured, avoid a policy of insurauce thereon ?

Questions of this kind have most comnonly arisen with reflerence to marine insurance. The general rule of law undoubtedly is, as stated by Judge STox:RY,
that every contract made for or about a
matter or thing which is prohibited, and
made unlawful by statute, is a void contract, although the statute does not mention that it shall he so, but only inflicts a
penalty on the ofibnder, because a penalty
implies a prohibition • Clark v. Protection
Ins. Co., I Story 122. See also Bartleft v. T-inor, Carlton R. 252 : Defegnis
v. Armistead, 10 fling. 107.
Accordingly it has been decided where
the in.-urance was on goods, a part of
which were by law prohibited from exportation, and the voyage as to such goods
was illegal in its origin, that therefore
the whole policy was void: Dlrkin y.
Dick, 2 Camp: 221 ; II East 502 ; Maryutt v. Wilson, 8 Term R. 31 ; Bird v.
Pigou, 2 Selwyn N. P. 991.
See also,
Law v. Goddard, 12 Afass. 112 ; Breed
v. Eaton, 10 Id. 21.
But while this
principle was conceded in Richardson v.
Maine F - A!. Ins. Cb., 6 Mass. 102;

it was intimated that insurance was not
void on a voyage prohibited by the trade
laws of a foreign state, nor on goods
contraband of war against capture and
condemnation on that account, if in either
case the facts are known to the underwriter, and the risks are not excepted in
the policy ; and in either of the two latter cases if the policy is void as to those
particular risks, it is still good against
other risks within it. Still another line
of cases hold that if the voyage as originally insured was valid, any subsequent
illegality in the course of the voyage will
not affect the policy, so far as, concerns
losses on. property not tainted by such
illegality, although connected with the
res gestie: Butler v. Allnutt, I Starkie
222 ; Keir v. Andrade, 6 Taunt. 498;
Sewell v. Roy. Er. Ins. Co., 4 Id. 855 ;
Ocean Ins. Co. v. Polleys, 13 Pet. 157.
Where a ship was insured on a voyage
to Liverpool, and took on boara in the
port ofNew Orleans, a chain cable, smuggled by another vessel, and was lost on
tie voyage to Liverpool by perils of the
sea, the underwriters were held liable for
a total loss on the policy, and it was held
also that the insurance on the chain cable
was good, the title being in the owner of
the vessel, and the illegality not attaching

HILNCKLEY v. GERMANIA FIRE INS. CO.
to the voyage on which it was used :
Clarke v. Protection Ins. Co., I Story
110.
Coming to contracts to insure property
on land, we find thatthey may be tainted
with illegality and avoided. Thus it has
been decided that a contract of insurance
made on Sunday, and not subsequently
ratified is void: Heller v. Crawford, 37
Ind. 279. It has not been unusual to insert in policies of insurance, a proviso
that the insurance should be void if the
building or property should be used for
any unlawful purpose. Such a -proviso
is valid and will be enforced.
The policy will be vitiated, for example, by a
tenant's use of the building for an unlawful purpose, even if without the owners'
knowledge : Kelly v. Worcester F. L Co.,
97 Mass. 285. And the uwe of a building
for storing whiskey with intent to sell the
same therein, and the sale of the same
there from time to time, by retail, without a license is a use of the building for
an unlawful purpose within the meaning
of such a proviso as above mentioned:
Kelly v. Worcester 31. F. I. Co., 97
Mass. 284 ; Johnson v. Union M. 4- F.
. Co., 127 Id. 555; Lawrence v. National F. L Co., Id. 557. In the Kelly.
case there appears to have been a proviso
in the policy, prohibiting the unlawful
use. Such a provision, however, doesnot
appear in the reports of the Johnson and
Lawrence cases, and in the Johnson case
it is explicitly said, speaking of the Kelly
decision, that "the grounds on which
that decision was placed, were that the
object of the assured in obtaining the
policy was to make their illegal business
safe and profitable, and that the direct
and immediate purpose of the contract
of insurance being to protect and encourage an unlawful traffic, the policy was
illegal and void, and the policy never
attached."
In Niagara F. I. Co. T. DeGraff, 12
Mich. 124, it is decided that spirituous
liquors kept illegally for sale, may notwithstanding, be lawfully insured against

destruction by fire, and that the risks insured against are not the consequences
of illegal acts, but accidents. The court,
Justice CAMPBEfLL, said : "It was claimed

on behalf of the plaintiffs in error that
if these liquors can be allowed to be included in a policy, the policy will be to
all intents and purposes insuring an illegal traffic ; and several cases were cited
involving marine policies on unlawful
voyages, and lottery insurances, which
have been held void on that ground.
These cases are not ai all parallel, because
they rest upon the fact, that in each instance it is made a necessary condition of
the policy that the illegal act shall be done.
The ship being insured for a certain
voyage that voyage is the only one upon
which tile
insurance would apply, and the
underwriters become thus directly a party
to an illegal act. So insuring a lotteryticket requires the lottery to be drawn in
order to attach the insurance to the risk.
If the policy were in express terms a
policy insuring the party selling liquors
against loss by fine or forfeiture, it would
be quite analogous. But this insurance
attaches only to property, and the risks
insured against are, not the consequences
of illegal acts but of accident.
Our
statute does not in any way destroy or
affect the right of property in spirituous
liquors or prevent title being transmitted
but renders sales unprofitable by preventing the vendor from availing hinself
of the ordinary advantages of a sale, and
also affixes certain penalties : Hibbardv.
People, 4 Mich. 125 ; Bagy v. Jerome, 7
Id. 145. If the wner sees fit to retain
his property without selling it, or to transmit it into another state or country, he
can do so. By insuring his property the
insurance company have no concern with
the use he may make of it, and as it is
susceptible of lawful uses, no one can be
held to contract concerning it in an illegal manner, unless the contract itself is
for directly illegal purposes. Collateral
contracts, in which no illegal design enters, are not affected by an illegal trans-
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action with which they may be remotely of insurance upon plaintiff's " stock of
connected. In the ease of Die Ocean fireworks-bazardous and extra-hazardIns. (1. v. Polle/s, 131'et. 157, an insur- ous," providing, however, "that the
ance upon a ship known by the insurance policy shall be null and void whenever
company to be liable to forfeiture under any article shall be kept in quantities
the registry laws of ti United States, greater than the law allows, or in a
was held valid, and a recovery was manner different from that prescribed by
permitted for a loss while sailing un- law, unless said use or keeping is speder papers known to be illegal. The cially provided for in this poliby." The
ease of Ar astrony v. Tole, ItIWheat.
plaintiff kept some dangerous "colored
258, is still stronger. It is diflicult to lights," contrary to a city ordinance,
perceive how public policy can be vio- which "colored lights" ignited and
lated by an insurance of any kind of
cau ed the loss- Held, that the written
property recognised by law to exist."
provision insuring the fireworks, &e.,
In Carriyan v, Lyjcoming 1 Ins. Co.,
was not repugnant to or a waiver of
10 Ins. Law. Jour. 606, it is decided the printed part, the meaning being that
that the illegal sale of liquors, where the plaintiff might keep only such firesuch sale is but a subordinate part of
works as it was lawful to keep under
the legitiiatc business of a druggist,
the municipal regulations, and lie havdoes not vitiate the policy on his stock ing violated the regulation in keeping
including such liquors. The court in the colored lights that caused the'fire, he
this case took the position that a con- could not recover.
tract directly insuring liquors intended
But in Boardnan v. Merrimack F.Ins.
for illegal sale would be void, but that Co., 8 Cush. 583, it was decided that
if the contract is collateral and inde- the drawing of a lottery with the consent
pendent, though in some measure con- and participation of the assured in a
nected with acts done in violation of
building insured against loss by fire, as
''a shoe mirnufaetory,"' does not avoid
law, it is not void.
In Jones v. ireinan's F. Ins. Co., 2 the policy on the building, nor on the
Daly 307, the defendants issued a policy stock therein.
ADELBERT HAMLTON.

Court of _rrors and Appeals of llIaryland.
LOUIS DE BIAN v. CARLOS GOLA.
A, onsul signing a note as consul is individually liable thereupon.
The consular seal does not make the note a single bill.
APPEAL from the overruling of a motion to quash an attachment
in an action oi assumpsit founded on promissory notes in the following form:
ROYAL CONSULAR AGENCY OF ITALY,

Baltimore, 2d June 1882.
Received from Charles Gola, Esq., for the use of this Vice-Consulate of Italy, $1500, to be returned within ninety days, with the
usual interest and commissions.
[Seal marked.]
E. DE MEROLLA.
Royal Consular Agency of Italy.
YOL.

,XXIII.-98

DE BIAN v. GOLA.

Another attaching creditor moved to quash on the grounds, inter
alia, that the instruments were under seal and were given by De
Merolla only in his representative capacity as vice-consul. The
court below refused the motion to quash, and the present appeal
was taken.
W. S. Bryan, Jr., and M. B. Walter, for appellants.
Charles Poe, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J. (after disposing of some minor questions of practice.)-There is nothing whatever on the face of these notes to show
that Merolla intended to make them sealed instruments in the legal
acceptation of that term, or that Gola received them as such. It
is apparent that Merolla borrowed these several sums from Gola at
a short date, and that he, Merolla, promised to return them, and
that Gola looked to him for the money. The seal impressed upon
the paper was not De Merolla's seal, but the seal of the Vice-Consulate of Italy, at Baltimore. He may have thought 'it added to
the respectability of the transaction to impress his official seal on
the paper, and even in one case to prefix his title of "Vice-Consul
of Italy" to his name, but the papers themselves only amount to an
acknowledgment that he, Merolla, bad borrowed these sums of
money and would return them. What "use" he put the money so
borrowed to is and was entirely immaterial to the lender, and does
not affect the contract. There are many "uses" that De Merolla could
- have borrowed this money for besides for the use of the "Vice-Consulate of Italy," but none of such "uses" could affect the contract between
Gola and himself, whether expressed in the receipt or not. The
.theory that these notes or receipts are obligations resting upon the
Vice-Consulate of Italy at Baltimore, and to be assumed and paid
by De Mverolla's successor in office, or to put the matter plainly,
that the Italian government, for that is what such a theory would
mean, would issue bonds or pay for all money borrowed by a viceconsul does not deserve any serious consideration.
We think the judgment should be affirmed.
YELLOTT,

RITCHIIE, J., dissenting (after alluding to the minor points of
practice).-The short-note declares upon the evidences of debt as
filed in assumpsit, and alleges the personal liability of De Merolla.
It is contended by appellants that the obligations were given by De
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M1erolla only in his representative character as consul, and that the
appellee must resort for their payment to the vice-consulate, or, in
effect, to the Italian government alone; and, further, that the contracts are under seal, and must be declared on as specialties. This
attachment does not procced upon fraud practised by De Merolla
in procuring the money lent on the notes, but on the notes themselves as produced. There must be an agreement between the
cause of action as set out in the affidavit and vouchers, and the averments of the short-note or declaration; otherwise the attachment
will not be supported; Browning v. Pasguny. 35 Md. 204; Dellone v. 1ull, 47 Id. 42.
If it be apparent from the face of the instruments that the debt
was not contracted by De Merolla individually, but was on behalf
of his government alone, the variance will be fatal, without reference to whether the instruments are sealed or not.
It is well established that the rules relating to private agents
and their principals are not applicable to public officers. Story
in his work on Agency, sect. 303, having previously discussed the
general law of agency, including that relating to agents or factors
of foreign principals, says " Hitherto we have been considering
the personal liability of agents on contracts with third parties in
cases of mere private agency. But a very different rule prevails
in general in regard to public agents ; for in the ordinary course
of things an agent, contracting in behalf of the government or of
the public, is not personally bound by such a contract, even though
lie would be by the terms of the contract were the agency one of a
private nature. The reason of the distinction is that it is not to be
presumed that the public agent means to bind himself personally
inacting as a functionary of the government, or that the party
dealing with him in his public character means to rely on his individual responsibility. On the contrary, the natural presumption
in such cases is that the contract was made on the credit and responsibility of the government itself as possessing an entire ability to
fulfil all its contracts far beyond that of any private man ; and that
it is ready to fulfil them not only with good faith, but with punctilious promptitude and in a spirit of liberal courtesy. Great
public inconvenience would result from a different doctrine, considering the various public functionaries the government musu employ
in order to transact its ordinary business and operations ; and many
persons would be deterred from accepting important offices of trust
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under the government if they were held personally liable upon all
their official contracts." And in the following section adds: "This
principle not only applies to simple contracts, both parol and written,
but also to instruments under seal which are executed by agents of
the government in their own names and purporting to be made by
them on behalf of the government; for the. like presumption prevails in such cases that the parties contract, not personally, but
merely officially within the sphere of their appropriate duties."
Cited in the margin, among others, are the leading cases on this
subject of Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch 345; Macheath v. Holdiment, 17 Conn. 172; Unvin v. Wolsely, Id. 674.
Kent, in his Commentaries, Vol. II., sec. 633, affirms the same
doctrine, as indeed do all the text books, and adds : "But the agent,
in behalf of the public, may still bind himself by an express
engagement, and the distinction terminates in a question of evidence.
The inquiry in all cases is, to whom was the credit in the contemplation of the parties intended to be given ?"
This question, where the contract is in writing, must be primarily
determined by recourse to the instrument itself.
BIGELOW, C. J., in Bray v. Kettell et al., 1 Allen 83, in con-'
struing the contract of an agent for a foreign principal, thus succinctly announces the doctrine to be: "But even in such a case the
fact that the principal is resident in a foreign country is only one
circumstance entering into the question of credit, and is liable to
be controlled by other facts, so in the case of a written contract;
it depends on the intention of the parties. But this, as in all other
cases of written instruments, must be determined mainly by the
terms of the contract. There may be cases where the language of
the contract is ambiguous, and it is doubtful to whom the parties
intended to give credit, in which the circumstance that the principal is resident abroad may be taken into consideration in determining the question of the liability of the agent. But when the terms
of the contract are clear and unambiguous, it must be deemed the
final repository of the intention of the parties, and its construction
and legal effect cannot be varied or changed by reference to facts
or circumstances affecting the convenience of the parties or the
reasonableness of the contract into which they have entered."
Upon an examination of the evidences of debt produced in this
case, it seems clear beyond question that De Merolla executed
them, not in his individual or private, but in his consular or official
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capacity. They are dated at the consulate office, the sum borrowed
is explicitly stated to be "for the use of this Vice-Consulate of
Italy," not his own use, and the obligation to repay the money is
not expressed in the usual form of a personal undertaking. "I
promise to pay," but the terms employed are, "to be returned," &c.
Superadded to all this there is attached, not his private seal, but
the public seal or stamp of the Vice-Consulate itself. This seal
could perform no private office, but can be explained only as an
attestation to an i..strument of a public nature; whether to give it
the legal character of a specialty or furnish evidence of its genuineness is immaterial.
Many good reasons sugest themselves why the lender of the
money would have preferred to give credit to the Vice-Consulate
or the government of Italy, instead of accepting, without security,
the merely personal obligation of De Merolla; and it is the only
reasonable and natural construction of the terms of the instruments
that such was their intention and effect.
I. Private _lgcts.-It isa general rule Y. JRzrne, 43 N. J. L. 659 ; Hayes v.
that one who signs his name to a con- Brubaker, 65 Ilnd. 27 ; " building comtract, no miatter what other words lie mittee," Anderson v. Pearce, 36 Ark.
ald%, (.iters lilto, a personal contract Oil .293; 38 Ant. Rep. 39; '' representing
B.," Gr,u v. MeVicker, 8 Biss. C. Cr.
whi,'h lie may persollally sue and lie ued.
The added words, such as 1,presi- 13 ; I' agent," Z,iyler v. M'ells, 28 Cal.
dent", " committee,' "'trustee,'" di- 263: ]aw Y.fekals, 65 Ga. 711 ; G-arector," &e., have no legal significance; lan v. I-'nestock, 5 Gill 215 ; Stewart
v. Kat.: 30 Aid. 334; Bijfjtui v. Chadtheir onisiou constitutes tto variance,
and they in to way affect the rights and wick, 8 Mass. 103 ; Pratt v. Beaupre,
13 Minu. 187 ; D(tnk v. Cook, 38 Ohio
liabilitics of the contracting parties.
Tlhu, a note -igned '"S. J. Tilden, St. 442 ; Brysoi V. Lucas, 84 N. C. 680;
aifield
Vetrymai, Grace Chlurch," is S. J. Til- 37 Am. Rep. 6.34 ; "cashier,"
del's pernitl note : Tilde, v. 3arnard, v.-Idaims, 16 Pick. 382; "curator,"
43 Mich. 376, 38 Am.Rep. 197. And we Lipscoib's MJ,-d, 2 Tex. 277 ; "guardian," (Girkaddenv. McGee, 7 W. &
fini the same decided of added words,
S. 140; " trader," Clark v. Lowe, 15
such a '"Iprsi-lclt and directors of A.
lass. 476 ; "tailor," Janes v. H'teRlilroad :"'Park v. lleite, 78 Ky. 243 ;
btalell v. Ilar n,an, 75 Me. 497; 46 bread, 11 Com. B. 406; "t::surer,"
Am. Rep. 421 ; BqTalo v. Bittlr, S7 Poss v. Brown, 74 Ale. 352 ; "colonel,"
N. Y. 250: ".Trustees of B. Lodge.ti .Me IF/il/anis v. Millis, 1 Wash. (77a,)
McChbllaa iV. Robe, 93 Ind. 298 ; 1171- 199 ; "overseer of the poor," Bay v.
Cook, 2 Zab. (N. J.) 343; "survivor,"
liam,,s
v. Ll,,
83 Id. 237 ; -rntees of C. Twp.." Revolving Se. v.Tat- Iandehorst v. .torrs, 3 Conn. 203, 207;
tle, 61 Iowa 423; 47 Ant. Rep. 816;
Parsons v. Boyd, 20 Ala. 112, 116 ;
Ming v. Glick, 56 Iowa473; 37 Am. Rep. " & Co.," Mv:Cool v. McChiine, Harp.
142 note ; A,,erican v.Stratton, 59 Iowa S. C. 486; Tuscott v. King, 6 Barb.
696 ; "Trustees of D. Church," Dayton 346 ; "trustee," Gill v. Carmihie, 55
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Gayle v.
Md. 342 ; "administrator,"
Ennis, 1 Tex. 184, 187; Wallisv.Lewis,

2 Ld. Raym. 1215-; Baker v. Hathaway,
5 Allen 103, 105 ; Mowry v. Adams, 14
Mass. 327, 329 ; Felty v. Young, 18 Md.
-163, 168.
The contract may, by express terms
or clear implication, show a contrary
intention, and save the signer from personal liability: Higgins v. Senior, 8
Mees. & W. 834 ; Glenn v. Allison, 58
Md. 527 ; and a contemporaneous oral
agreement that such personal liability
should not exist may be proved : Wake
v. Harrop, 30 L. J. Ex. 273; 31 Id.
451 ; Mfetcalf v. Williams, 104 U. S. 93.
But oral evidence is not admissible, in
a case where the signer's liability is in
question, to show that the contract was
not the contract of the signer hut that
of some other person or of some corporation: Williams v. Lafayette, 83 Ind.
237 ; Rendell v. Harriman,75 Me. 497;
46 Am. Rep. 421. The only safe way,
therefore, for a person to sign a contract
made in a representative capacity is,
"such and such an estate," or "corporation," or "person," by "A., president," or "by B., agent," or " by C.,
trustee:" Hitchcock v. Buchanan, 105
tr. S. 416; Turner v. Potter, 56 Iowa
251 ; Castle v. Belfast, 72 Me. 167 : or
to expressly stipulate in the contract
that he shall not be personally liable.
Such bard cases have arisen under
this rule that it has sometimes been ignored or disregarded. See Afetcalf v.
Williams, 104 U. S. 93; Whitney v.
Wyman, 101 Id. 892; New Market v.
Gillet, 100 Ill.
254; 39 Am. Rep. 39 ;
Hypes v. Grifln, 89 111. 134; Wallisv.
Johnson, 75 Ind. 368 ; Armstrong v. Kirkpatrick, 79 Id. 527 ; Purnitonv.Security,
72 Me. 22; Simpson v. Garland,Id. 40;
39 Am. Rep. 297 ; Glenn v. Allison, 58
Md. 527 ; Stearns v. Allen, 25 Hun 558;
Whritford v. Laidler, 94 N. Y. 145; 46
Am. Rep. 131 ; Fowle v. Klerchner, 87
N. C. 49 ; Markley v. Quay, 14 Fhila.

164. And in Georgia the rule is changed
by statute: Fleming v. Hill, 62 Ga.
751.
II. Public Agents.-There is no doubt
of the existence of the distin,tion between
public and private agents referred to in
the dissenting opinion above. If a public agent acts within his authority and
makes known the fact that he is contracting in his representative capacity,
he is not liable though he contracts in
his own name: Hodqson v. Dexter, 1
Cr. 345 ; Dwindle v. Henriquez, 1 Cal.
387 ; State v. McCauley, 15 Id. 429 ;
Perry v. Hyde, 10 Conn. 329 ; Yulee v.
Canora, 11 Fla. 9; Ghent v. Adams, 2
Ga. 214; Copes v. Matthews, 18 Miss.
398 ; Tutt v. Hobbs, 17 Mo. 486 ; Stanly v. Hawkins, Mart. 52 ; Dawes v.
Jackson, 9 Mass. 490; Freeman v. Otis,
Id. 272; Brown v. Austin, I Id. 208 ;
Bainbridgev. Downie, 6 Id. 253 ; Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Id. 522; Enloe v. Hall,
1 Humph. 303; Miller v. Ford, 4 Rich.
376 ; Amison v..Ewing, 2 Caldw. 366 ;
Tutt v. Lewis, 3 Call. 233; Syme v.
Butler, 1 Id. 105 ; Adams v. 117lsittlesey,
3 Conn. 560; Osgood v. Grosvenor, 1
Root 89 ; Walker v. Swarthwout, 12
Johns. 443 ; McCurdyv. Rogers, 21 Wis.
197. But he is bound if he does not
disclose the fact that he is making a public contract : Sheffieldv. NWratson, 3 Caines
69; Swift v. Hopkins, 13 Johns. 313;
or uses words showing his intention to
bind himself: McClenticks v. Bryant, 1
Mo. 598; or transcends his authority:
New York v. Harbison, 16 Fed. Rep. 688;
Olenticks v. Bryant, I Mo. 598; Hammarskold v. Bull, 11 Rich. 493; or it
appears the credit was given to him:
Lapsley v. McKinstry, 38 Mo. 245;
Brown v. Rundlett, 15 N. H. 360. A
consul has no right to borrow money
for his government; it is not within the
scope of his authority, and therefore
Merolla was liable on the note in the
principal case.
DAVID STEWART
Baltimore.
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Supqreme Court of Wisconsin.
COMSTOCK v. BECHTEL.
An inm.dvent debtor who sells property which is suject to levy on execution, and
with the proceeds immediately purchases exempt property, will be presumed to have
done so with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors ; but the property so
iurcha cl does not, for that reaon, cease to be exempt. The only remedy of the
creditors isby attacking the salc of the non-exempt property.

APPEAL from Circuit Court, Dane county.

Replevin for two horses, one harness, one sleigh, one wagon, and
two cows, alleged to have been levied upon and seized by the defendant. who was the sheriff of Dane county, by virtue of a certain
attachment, and an execution duly issued by the circuit court of
that county against the property of the plaintiff, and in the hands
of such sheriff for service. The plaintiff claims that the property
in controversy is exempt from seizure by virtue of such writs.
In his answer the defendant justifies the seizure of the property
by virtue of the aforesaid writs, and alleges that the same is not
exempt from being so seized, because the'plaintiff was one of a firm
hopelessly insolvent, against which judgments for large amounts
had been rendered, and others were about to be entered in actions
then pending, and that plaintiff, for the purpose of defrauding the
creditors of such insolvent firm, sold certain notes and securities
owned by him, and not exempt, and with the proceeds thereof purchasc'l the property so seized with the intention of holding it as
exempt property.

The cau-ic was tried by the court without a jury. The court
found that the defendant was sheriff- of Dane county, and as such,
by virtue of valid process, seized the property claimed on February
1st 1884, and that at the time of such seizure the same was all the

personal property which the plaintiff owned: also that the value
of the property was $085, and that the amount for which such writs
were issued exceeded that sum. The more material findings of fact
are as follows: " (5) That on the thirty-first day of December the
said plaintiff was the owner of, and held in his own name, a note
secured by mortgage upon real estate of the value of twelve hundred dollars ($1200), and one note of the value of one hundred dollars ($100). (6) That at this time the said plaintiff was heavily
indebted and wholly insolvent ; that said plaintiff, although repeat-

edly requested by his creditors to pay his indebtedness, immediately
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preceding the date of the purchase of said property, to wit, January 1st 1884, neglected so to do ; that said plaintiff, at the time so
requested by his'creditors to pay his indebtedness, stated to his said
creditors that he was unable to pay, and that he did not have or
own any property or money wherewith to pay and discharge his
indebtedness. (7) That said plaintiff did, on the 31st day of December
1883, dispose of and sell said notes to one Stewart Shampnor, and
thereby intended to prevent and keep his creditors from levying on
said note for the purpose of satisfying their claims, and that the
said plaintiff, on the 1st day of January 1884, did use the funds
by him raised on the sale of the notes as aforesaid, and applied said
funds in payment of the purchase price of the property above
described, and by him so claimed as personal exemptions, and that
the said plaintiff, by said purchase of said property, intended to
and did acquire the personal property exemptions by law provided,
and that said plaintiff, by said immediate purchase, intended to prevent his said creditors from interfering with his said rights to acquire
said personal property exemptions by means of their levying on and
applying said moneys in satisfaction of their claims and demands
against him."
As conclusions of law the court found "that said plaintiff is entitled to the return of said property, and to hold'it as his personal
property exemptions ;" also that he was entitled to recover nominal
damages and costs. Judgment for the ilaintiff was ordered and
entered accordingly. The defendant appeals.
La Follette &' Siebecker, for respondent.
Rufus B. Smith, for appellant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
LYoN, J.-The circuit court found that the plaintiff sold the notes
mentioned in the findings of facts with the intention of preventing
a seizure thereof by his creditors; and that, with the proceeds of
the notes, he purchased the property in controversy, intending
thereby to acquire exempt personal property which would be beyond
the reach of his creditors. That such were the intentions of the
plaintiff is the inevitable conclusion from the facts of the sale of
the notes and the purchase of the property, because it must be presumed that the plaintiff intended the necessary results of his acts,
and it was the necessary and inevitable result of such sale and pur-
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chase (if valid) that the notes, and the property purchased with the
proceeds thereof, were thereby placed beyond the reach of creditors
of the plaintiff. The intention of the plaintiff is, therefore, rather
the subject of a conclusion of law to be deduced from the facts,
than an independent fact in the case. The findings would not have
been any more favorable to the plaintiff had nothing been said
therein concerning his intentions ; and for like reasons they would
not be any less favorable to. him had the court found expressly that
such sale and purchase were made by the plaintiff with intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors. That also is the subjectmatter of a deduction from the facts.
The material facts are, therefore, that the plaintiff was wholly
insolvent ; that he owned two notes which were liable to be reached
by his creditors ; and that he sold such notes, and, with the proceeds, immediately purchased the property in controversy. From
these facts the intention of the plaintiff to place his property beyond
the reach of legal process must be presumed. The precise question
to be determined is, therefore, is property which under the statute
(Rev. St. 781, see. 2982, § 6) is ordinarily exempt from seizure on
attachment or execution liable to such seizure if the debtor is insolvent, and has purchased the property with the proceeds of other
property, not exempt, with the intention of holding the property so
purchased as exempt, and thus preventing his creditors from collecting their debts out of his property ? The question now arises for
the first time in this court.
The creditors whom the defendant (the sheriff) represents do not
attack the validity of the sale of the notes by the plaintiff, or the
purchase by him of the property in controversy. On the contrary,
their theory necessarily is that both the sale and purchase are legal
transactions,-the sale divesting the plaintiff of all title to the notes,
and the purchase vesting in him a good title to the property thus
acquired. But they maintain that because the notes might have
been reached by legal process while the insolvent debtor owned
them, it ought to be held that no right of exemption to the property
purchased with the proceeds of the notes ought to be upheld.
Several cases are cited by counsel for defendant to this proposition,
and it is doubtless sustained by some of them, particularly by Biddell v. Shirley, 5 Cal. 488; Emerson v. Smith, 51 Penn. St. 90;
Brackett v. Watkins, 21 Wend. 68; Grimes v. Bryne, 2 Minn.
104 (Gil. 72) ; In re Wright, 3 Biss. 859 ; Pratt v. Burr, 5 Id.
VOL. XXXIII.-99
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36. It is understood, however, that the opposite doctrine now prevails in California and New York. See Randall v. Buffington, 10
Cal. 491 ; Wilcox v. Hawley, 81 N. Y. 648.
We think it must be conceded that there are very serious objections to the doctrine which the cases first above cited (and perhaps
others) seem to assert. In the first place, it interpolates a qualification or limitation in the statute of exemptions not written therein
The statute exempts the specific property
by the legislature.
therein mentioned absolutely and unconditionally. The iule of
these cases is that it shall not be exempt at all if.purchased by an
insolvent debtor with the proceeds of nen-exempt property. This
court has steadily held that it has no authority to make such interpolations: .Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43; Chase v. Whiting,
30 Id. 544.
Counsel for the defendants seeks to avoid the force of this principle by saying that courts do, by construction, sometimes ingraft
-exceptions upon statutes, and he refers, as an illustration, to the
line of cases which hold that the contributory negligence of the
injured party will defeat a recovery in an action against a town to
recover damages for an injury alleged to have been caused by a
defective highway, whereas the statute giving the right of action
contains no such qualification of the right. The cases are not parallel. The statute gives a right of action only when the injury is
caused by the insufficiency of the highway. The courts merely
hold that the injury is not so caused if the negligence of the injured
party contributes proximately to it. These are cases of authorized
construction of the words of a statute. In this case we are asked
to ingraft a limitation upon a statute when there is not a line or a
word therein which will justify it.
Again, the doctrine under consideration rests upon the ground
that exemption is merely a personal privilege of the debtor which
the courts may lawfully adjudge forfeited for his fraud and dishonesty. This is too narrow a view. Our exemption laws were enacted
in obedience to the mandate of the constitution: "The privilege
of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life shall be recognised by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability
hereafter contracted." Art. 1, § 17.
This mandate and these laws are grounded in the soundest considerations of public policy, in that they are designed to secure not
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only to the debtor, but to his family, the necessary comforts of life,
as against his creditors; thus protecting and guarding the highest
interests both of the individual citizen and of the family, the benefits
of which to the state can scarcely be overrated. In Mfaxwell v.
Reed. 7 Wis. 582, Mr. Justice SMITH spoke of the exemption laws
as "one of the great bulwarks of individual freedom and manly
In
citizenship so carefully guarded by the fundamental law."
dealing with the exemption -laws this court has steadily kept these
considerations in view, and has rejected every construction of them
which would tend to defeat the beneficent purposes for which they
were enacted. It has always given them a liberal construction in
favor of the exemption, and in the case last cited, it held that a
stipulation in a note, waiving the benefit of such laws in respect to
the indebtedness thereby created, was inoperative and void because
opposed to a sound public policy. The principles upon which this
court has uniformly thus acted seem to be disregarded in the cases
which hold that in a case like this the right of exemption is forfeited.
Moreover, the rule of these cases would deprive insolvent debtors
of the right to acquire any exempt property with the proceeds of
property not exempt. An insolvent debtor may have S50 in his
pocket. While he retains the money his creditors may reach it by
legal process. Under the rule above mentioned, if he should purchase a cow with the money, no matter how sorely he and his family may need the cow, the creditor may seize and sell her upon execution. And this, not because it was a fraud on the creditor for
the debtor to purchase the cow with his own money, but because
such a use of the money operated in some mysterious way to repeal
the exemption laws in respect to that particular cow.
For the reason above suggested we cannot approve the doctrine
of the cases relied upon by the defendant to defeat the plaintiff's
right of exemption in the property in controversy. The true rule
is if the plaintiff made a fraudulent sale of the notes his creditors
may reach them in the hands of the fraudulent purchaser, collect
or sell them, and apply the 'proceeds on their demands. That is
their only reinedy against the fraud, and the sale of the notes is
the only fraud in the transaction. The purchase by the plaintiff
of exempt property with the proceeds of thenotes was a legal transaction, containing no element of fraud. The absolute title to the
property so purchased vested in the plaintiff, one of the incidents
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of which was the right under the exemption laws to hold it against
his creditors.
The foregoing views are sustained by a large number of cases
cited by counsel for plaintiff. We are satisfied that these cases lay
down the correct rules of law applicable to this case. It follows
that the plaintiff is entitled to hold the property claimed exempt
from seizure, and hence that the case was correctly decided by the
circuit court.
Judgment affirmed.
In 1857, it was held by Mr. Justice
MILLER, in Pratt v. Burr, 5 Biss. 36
(U. S. Ct. for Dist. of Wisconsin), that
where the defendant purchased goods of
the plaintiff with which to replenish a
stock which he afterwards sold, and
purchased exempt property with the
proceeds, the exemption in such case
"The mere
could not be sustained.
statement of the facts," said the learned
judge, "decides this case, in the conscience of every man, that neither in law
nor justice the exemption should be allowed. The defendant cannot expect
the court to assist him in consummating
the intended fraud. A party cannot turn
that which is granted him for the comfort of himself and family into an instrument of fraud."
In Riddell v. Shirley, 5 Cal. 488, an
insolvent debtor sold certain personal
property to the plaintiffs for the purpose
of raising money with which to discharge
debts which were a lien upon his homestead. A creditor attached the goods,
and the plaintiff brought replevin for
them. HEYDEN ELDT, J., said: "Although the law secures the homestead
from execution arising from ordinary indebtedness, it is yet made chargdable for
debts by the act of the parties interested
in its preservation, and in some instances by operation of law. Where such
cases exist, it would seem to be only
fair that the homestead should remain
answerable for the debts charged upon
it, and not, after becoming a source of
credit, be relieved intentionally, by the
disposition of all the other property of

the debtor, leaving nothing for the satisfaction of the othdr creditors. Such a
sale, except to a creditor, in payment of
his debt, and free from knowledge of
or collusion with the object of the debtor,
must be considered a fraud in fact and
in law. It is a sale with the direct intent of benefit or advantage to the seller, to the injury of the creditor." See
Re Wright, 3 Biss. 359.
In Randall v. Buffington , 10 Cal. 491,
Ch. J. FiELD said : " For the disposition
of this case, we shall assume the fact that
his insolvency was established, and, upon
this assumption, it is difficult to perceive
how the payment of a debt which he
legally owed, and which was past due,
can be tortured into an act to hinder,
delay and defraud creditors. The debt
was as sacred as any other debt, the
obligation to pay it was as binding, and,
even if the payment constituted a preference, there is no rule of law which
prevents a debtor, in insolvent circumstances, from the application of his property to the pityment of one debt rather
than another: Dana v. Stanfords, 10 Cal.
269 ; Nicolson v. Leavitt, 4 Sand. 252 ;
Covanhoven v. Hart, 21 Penn. St. 495;
Worland v. Kimberlin, 6 B. Mon. 608;
Kennaird v. Adams, It Id. 102.
"But, it is urged with apparent confidence in the conclusive character of
the position, that the payment resulted
to the benefit of the defendant, as it
relieved his homestead of the encumbrance, and, consequently, of liabilityof
being sold for its satisfaction. We confess our inability to see what difference
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this can make in the transaction. The
obligation to pay the debt was not the
1. - binding because it was secured by
mortgage ; and, if a lien was removed
from the homestead, it was the consequence of an act lawful in itself. The
payment conferred upon

the debtor no

new right. Ie owned the homestead
flee from liability befibre the debt of the
plaintiff was contracted, and he simply
restored its former exemption by paying a debt which he bed incurred upon
its security.
"Tie case of Riddell v. Shirley, 5 Cal.
488, is a very different one from this.
In that case there was a fraudulent and
collusive sale of the debtor's property to
discharge liens upon his homestead ; the
vendee was not acreditor receiving payment of a debt, and no claim against
the homestead was asserted. The opinion expressly excepts from its conclusion
a case like the present. I To make this
case,' very justly observes the learned
counsel for the respondent in his brief,
&at all like Riddell v. Shirley, the plaintiff ought to sue Drew to get the money
back which the defendant paid him; but
the absurdity of such a proceeding is too
apparent to need any comment.' "
Notwithstanding the remarks of the
learned judge, the case seems to overrule
Riddell v. Shirley. See Thompson on
Homesteads and Exemptions, sect. 306.
In Illinois it is held not to be a fraud
for an insolvent debtor to purchase a
homestead, even though he cause the
title to be vested in his wife, if he in
good faith intended it as a homestead :
Cipperly v. Rhodes, 53 111. 346. BREESE,
C. J., said: "No question is made that
the homestead right would have ex'isted
in Rhodes, had'he taken the deed to the
lot in his own name instead of taking it
in. the name of his wife. He paid the
purchase-money wholly out of his own
funds, and at a time he had a right to
obtain a homestead which would not be
liable for his debts then existing, or to be
subsequehtly contracted : and the sole

question is whether taking the deed to
his wife placed the property beyond the
protection of the homestead law. This
is an inquiry into which the aninus enters largely. Did he purchase it as and
for a homestead, and has it been so used
and held. If such was his intention,
then taking the (heed to his wife would
not, we think, cut off that right. If the
design was simply to acquire property,
which he could hold in fraud of his creditors, then the law would strip it of its
covering, and subject it to the payment
of the debts. But it must be remembered
that it was not a fraud on his creditors
to buy a homestead which would be beyond their reach."
Following Randall v. Bu.fflngton, it
was held that an insolvent debtormight
appropriate land to the use of a homestead even after a judgment was obtained against him, but before it became
a lien upon the land : Culver v. Rogers,
28 Cal. 520. In n re Henkel, 2 Sawyer 307, the United States District Court
held that under the law of California an
insolvent might apply funds in his possession to the discharge of an encumbrance on his homestead without impairing its inviolability, and that a homestead
might be declared at any time before the
lien of a judgment had actually attached.
In Nevada, property which possesses
the characteristics of a homestead may
be selected at any time before actual sale
or execution, and the right of such selection is not destroyed by the insolvency
of a debtor or the levy of an attachment:
Hawthorne v. Smith, 3 Nev. 182. See
furthcron this point Thompson on Homesteads and Exemptions .319 ; ".iotterv.
Dobbs, 38 Miss. 198; Irwin v. L'weis,
50 Id..363; Letchford v. Cary, 52 Id.
791; Stone v. Darnell, 20 Tex. 11 ;
Giddings v. Crosby, 24 Id. 295; 3acmantis v. Campbell, 37 Id. 267 ; North
v.Shear, 15 Id. 174.
In Edmondson v. Meacham, .50 Miss.
34, the rule is stated to be as follows :
"A debtor may innocently subtract
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from his resources such means as may be
reasonably necessary for the support of
his family. fHis creditors, therefore, cannot pursue and reach the money of the
husband and father paid for such necessary purposes, as the maintenance of the
family and education of the children.
But subject to that right, the debtor must
devote his property and means to his
creditors. If the husband takes money
which ought to pay his debts and invests
in the purchase of real estate or other

property for wife or children, the transaction may be fraudulent or not, as the
husband may be indebted or not, and
then by a comparison of his debts with
the resources retained by him. If he
was insolvent at the time of the purchase,
the evidence is overwhelming and conelusive that the motive was to make a
gift at the expense of creditors, and that
the intent was to withdraw his means
from their reach."
CinLEs BuitxE ELLIOTT.
Minneapolis.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
LLOYD v. WAYNE CIRCUIT JUDGE.
A statute which provides for the ante mortem probate o a will is inoperative and
void.

A proceeding authorized by such statute by which questions as to competency,
undue influence, &c., can be determined in advance of the testator's death, is not
within any recognised judicial power, and the courts cannot be called upon to
enforce it.
MIANDAMUS.
John

. Bissell, for relator.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-In this case Lloyd attempted to have his will
established during life in the Probate Court for Wayne county, and
an appeal was taken from the Probate to the Circuit Court. In
that court the circuit judge was of opinion that the proceeding was
extra-judicial, and refused to allow it to go on; but instead of dismissing or quashing it on that ground, entered an order affirming
the probate decree. Mandamus is now applied to vacate that order.
There can be no doubt of the impropriety of the order of the
Circuit Court. By affirming the probate order he asserted jurisdiction, and he had no right to affirm it without a hearing on the merits. But whether he should proceed to such a hearing is the
principal question before us. The case is one where we can get no
help from similar precedents, as the statute is new and singular.
Judicial proceedings to probate a will while the testator is living
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are unheard of in this country or in England; and inasmuch as
the. 'itute only makes the decree effective in the single case of the
establishment of the will and subsequent death without revocation
or alteration, and leaves it open to the testator to make any subsequent arrangement which he maydesire, or to oust the jurisdiction
by change of residence, or to leave the will once rejected open to
probate in the usual way after death, the proceeding is still more
anomalous. I am disposed to think with the circuit judge, that
this is not in any sense a judicial proceeding which he was bound
.to consider or entertain.
This is the first instance in our jurisprudence in which an attempt
has been made to compel a living person, as a condition of relief,
to enter upon a contest with those who, until his death, can have
no recognition anywhere, and who after his death are presumed to
represent him, and not any hostile interest. The maxim that the
living can have no heirs is as well settled by statute as by common
law. Until a man dies it can never be known who will succeed him,
even if intestate ; and whatever may be the probability, there is no
certainty that a single one of the persons who have come in here to
oppose the will may survive the testator. The law gives no preference to contingent expectations, and legally it is just as possible
that the state may take by escheat as that the person now litigating,
or any other more remote relatives will become interested. It is
also within the power of relator to dispose of his entire property,
not merely by a new will, but by sale or gift, and in such event
there will be nothing for this will to dispose of and possibly nothing
for these or any other kindred to inherit. It is also competent for
him to go into another county or state or country, either of which
acts would put his estate beyond the jurisdiction of Wayne county;
and either of the two latter may change the course of inheritance
or otherwise affect the disposal of his estate.
I-cannot conceive it possible that the proceeding can be dealt
with as judicial when the chief party to it will not be precluded
by the decree from doing exactly as he might have done had the
court never been called on to act at all. This statute, which was
probably designed to prevent the unseemly and disgraceful attempts
too often made to defeat the enforcement of the last will of persons
whose competency to deal with their own affairs was never doubted
or interfered with, has been so drawn as to remove none of the difficulties, but rather to make them worse. It is a singular, and in
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my judgment a very unfortunate spectacle, to see a man compelled
to enter upon a contest with the hungry expectants of his own
estate, and litigate while living with those who have no legal claims
whatever upon him, but who may subject him to ruinous costs and
delays in meeting such testimony as is apt to be paraded in such
cases.
The practice which has usually prevailed in civil law countries,
and also is said to have been customary in various parts of England
(see Seld. Ece. Jur. Test. 5) of having wills executed or declared
in solemn form, or acknowledged before reputable oflcers and a sufficient number of disinterested witnesses to render it unlikely that
the testator is not acting with capacity and freedom, has been
approved by the continued experience of most countries, and has
saved them from the po8t mortem squabblings and contests on mental condition which have made a will the least secure of all human
dealings, and made it doubtful whether in some regions insanity is
not accepted as the normal condition of testaton. There is no sensible reason why a will which is always revocable and contingent
should not be established, presumptively at least, by such an acknowledgment as will suffice to prove a deed which is irrevocable; and
where, as is usually the case abroad, such an acknowledgment is
made before trustworthy officers, in the 'presence of known and
reputable witnesses, and in the enforced absence of all other persons,
the security against incapacity and incompetency is quite as strong
as can be found in a contest before a court or jury that never saw
the testator. A man's incapacity, if it Fxists, will not easily escape
the notice of his disinterested friends and eighbors, and when they
certify to his competency and freedom of ac "-nwith their attention
directly called to their own responsibility in aing so, they are seldom mistaken, and those who seek to impugn thei. action, if allowed
to do it at all, should be compelled to assume the Nurden and risk
themselves. But this is not judicial action.
In the proceedings of various kinds familiar in Englnd, where
conveyances are made effective by acknowledgment and enrolment
before various classes of public officers and tribunals, it was never
deemed proper or necessary to bring general heirs presumptive
before the acknowledging officer, in order to give efficacy to transfers
in fee simple, either of man or woman, although they are as clearly
affected in their prospects of inheritance as they would be by a will.
And in the cases where testimony is to be perpetuated for use in

LLOYD v. WAYNE CIRCUIT JUDGE.

793

future controversies, the rule is inflexible that no matter how great
the probability of inheritance may be, the heir presumptive is not
either a competent or permissible party to such litigation ; and this
is so even in case of estates tail, and although the circumstances
are as strong as possible against the chances of any change : -Earl
Belfast v. Chichester, 2 Jac. & W. 439 ; Allan v. Allan, 15 Yes.
130 ; Lord Dursley v. Fitzhardinge, 6 Id. 251 ; Sackvill v. Ayleworth, 1 Vern. 105; Sniith v. Attorney- General, 6 Yes. 260;
s. c., in note 1 P. Wins. 117.
The broadest definition ever given to the judicial power, confines
it to controversies between conflicting parties in interest, and such
can never be the condition of a living man and his possible heirs.
Our statutes have never undertaken, and do not in this case undertake to give to the heirs any interest which will ever be fixed by
this probate, or which may not be cut off at any time by their own
death, or by relator by new will or conveyance. It is by no means
free from doubt what classes of probate proceedings under our system are to be treated as judicial proceedings in the proper sense of
that term ; and it is not important here to consider that question,
because this proceeding is not even a suit for probate. There has
never been any proceeding known to our laws for the mere purpose
of establishing the will even of a deceased person. The probate
of wills under our statutes, is merely a part of the proceedings to
administer the estates of deceased persons in the court that has
jurisdiction and charge of the estates. This rule is so general,
that in some states devises are not probated at all, and in some the
probate is not conclusive, because controversies concerning land are
usually tried in other courts. We have enlarged the jurisdiction in
probate so as to reach lands for some purposes, and have made all
wills subject to probate. But there is no case where an original
probate can be granted here, except in the court having jurisdiction
over the estate; it cannot be done separately. This statnte does
not attempt to change the.place of ultimate probate, and it does
not make a.decree against the will either a bar or even admissible
to prevent future probate after death. It makes no provision for
making a finding either way evidence for any purpose during testator's life, so as to negative testamentary capacity, or otherwise to
affect him. And it has no force for any purpose so long as he lives.
I am of opinion that the statute is inoperative, as not within any
recognised judicial power, and that the courts can not be called
VOL.
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upon to administer it, and that the mandamus should vacate the
whole proceedings.
SHERWOOD

and

CHAMPLIN,

JJ., concurred.

This case is one of great interest both
on account of the novelty and importance of the principles involved. So far
as we can learn, the statute in question
'is new in principle, and the decision
thereupon is certainly unique. As the
statute, which is published in the Public
Acts of Michigan for 1883, on page 17,
may not be accessible to all the readers
of the Register, and is not given in the
opinion, we reproduce it here.
"An act to provide for the establishment of wills during the lifetime of testators.
" Sect. 1. The people of the state
of Michigan enact, that to any will heretofore or hereafter executed, the testator
may make and annex his petition, to be
sworn to before and presented to the
judge of probate for the county where
the testator resides, asking that such will
be admitted and established as his last
will and testament.
" Sect. 2. Every such petition shall
contain averments that such will-was duly
executed by the petitioner without fear,
fraud, impartiality, or undue influence,
and with a full knowledge of its contents,
and that the.testator is of sound mind
and memory and full testamentary capacity, and shall state the names and address of every person who at the time of
making and filing the same would be interested in the estate of the maker of such
will as heir if such maker should at the
making of such petition become deceased,
and may also contain the names and addresses of any other persons whom such
testator may desire to make parties to
such proceedings.
"Sect. 3. Such judge of probate shall
thereupon, upon request of such testator,
appoint a time for the hearing of such
petition, and issue citations to the parties
named in such petition, and direct pub-

lished notice of such hearing, and have
such hearing, after proof of service of
citations and of publication of notice, in
the manner, as near as practicable, as is
required for the probate of wills.
"Sect. 4. If any person named in
such petition shall be a minor, or otherwise under disability, a guardian ad litem
shall be appointed by such judge to represent such person. On such bearing
such judge of probate shall examine into
the matters alleged in such petition, and
into the testamentary capacity of such
testator, and e -amine witnesses in relation thereto, anl if it shall appear that
the allegations of such petition are true,
and that said testator was of sound mind
and memory and full testamentary capacity, such judge shall make A decree
thereon, and shall cause a copy of such
decree to be attached to said wil!, certified under the seal of said cour' decreeing that the testator, at the aking of
such will and such petition, v s possessed
of sound mind and memory. and full testamentary capacity, and *.at said will
was executed without fes , fraud, impartiality or undue influer .e, which decree
shall have the same ec ect as if made by
said court after the death of the testator
on the probate of such will, and such
will having been so established shall not
be set aside or impeached on the grounds
of insanity or want of testamentary capacity on the part of the testator, or that
the same was executed through fear,
fraud, impartiality, or undue influence.
"Sect. 5. Appeals shall be in the
same manner as from probate of wills.
" Sect. 6. Nothing in this act contained
shall be construed to prevent the revocation of such will, or alteration or other
change thereof, as in ordinary wills."
Approved April 1 th 1883.
The great learning and experience of
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Judge CAMPBELL, who delivered the
opinion of the court iii this case, would

certainly lead one to consider well any
opinion he might express adverse to the
conclu~ion arrived at.
The question seems to us to be one of
co. :dcrable difficulty. In the absence
of the briefs of counsel we have ransacked the books for some broader and
more satisfhetory definition of- judicial
power than that given by the learned
judge, hut without success. We confess
to a desire to find some reasonable
ground for criticising the conclusion arrived at, for if the unseemly contests
respecting the testamentary capacity of
testators can be legally prevented, it is a
consummation devoutly to be wished.
Judge CAMPBELL says: " The broadest

definition ever given to judicial power
confines it to controversies between conflicting parties in interest, and such can
never be the condition of a living man
and his possible heirs." The italics are
our own.

"The difference between the departments [of government] undoubtedly is,
the legislative makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes, the
law :" Per MARISHALL, C. J., in Mayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 46; per
Grisox, C. J., in Greenouqh v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494.
That which distinguishes a judicial
from a legirlative act is. that one is a
determination of what the existing law
is in relation to some existing thing
already done or happened, while the
other is a predetermination of what the
law shall be for the regulation of all
future cases falling under its provisions:
Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77.
To adjudicate upon and protect the
rights and interests of individual citizens. and to that end to construe and
apply the laws, is the peculiar province
of the judicial departmenti Cincinati,
6-c., ld. Co. v. C(bnmissioners, .&r-., I
Ohio St. 81 ; Cooley Const. Lim. *91.
"The former [judicial tribunals] de-

cide upon the legality of claims and
conduct, and the latter [legislative tribunalb] make rules upon which, in connection with the constitution, those decisions should be founded. It is the
province of judges to determine what
the law is upon existing cases. In fine,
the law is applied by the one, and made
by the oher. To do the first, therelore,
-to compare the claims of parties with
the laws of the land before established,
-is in its nature a judicial act. * * *
It is the province of judicial power, also,
to decide private disputes between or concerning persons ; but of legislative power
to regulate public concerns, and to make
laws for the benefit and welfare of the
state :" WooDBuRY, J., in Merrill v.
Sierburne, I N. H. 204. See, also, generally, Cooley Const. Lim. *90-92.
In all the above definitions, when not
expressly so stated, it is assumed that
there is a controver-y between parties
in interest, upon which the court is
called to act.
The law of parties to action at law and
in chancerv, and the well-known rule
that a court will not pass upon a mere
moot case or one in which there is no
real controversy, are also additional evidence of the correctness of the decision
in the rincipal case. Under oursystem,
unlike the Roman civil law, there is no
other method of growth of judge-made
law except upon actual cases arising
between parties in interest. The fact
that in a few states by constitutional enactment the legislative or executive departments have been empowered to
require the opinion of the Supreme Court
"upon important questions of law, and
upon solemn occasions," in advance of
actual litigation, would seem to lend additional force to the definitions above
quoted. See Cooley's Const. Lim. *40.
Upon the whole, Judge CAMPBELL, in
the clause above quoted, seems to have
struck tile key-note of the question, and
to have arrived at the true conclusion.
However desirable it may be to have a

